Residence Waiting Period Denies Equal Protection by Holland, Tommy L.
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 6 Issue 3 
1970 
Residence Waiting Period Denies Equal Protection 
Tommy L. Holland 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tommy L. Holland, Residence Waiting Period Denies Equal Protection, 6 Tulsa L. J. 268 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol6/iss3/7 
This Casenote/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6, No. 3
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: RESIDENCE WAITING
PERIOD DENIES EQUAL PROTECTION
In Shapiro v. Thompson,' the United States Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional the provisions of two state statutes2
and a District of Columbia Statute8 which required a one year
waiting period before an applicant could become eligible for
welfare assistance.4 In addition to the foregoing statutes,
Shapiro, in effect invalidated similar provisions in the wel-
fare legislation of a great majority of the states.
Shapiro involved six individuals who had been denied
aid to families with dependent children and one permanently
1 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
2 ComN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-2d (Supp. 1965), cited in Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 622 n.2 (1969); PA. STAT. tit. 62, §
432 (6) (1968), cited in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
626 n.5 (1969).
2 D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-203 (1967), cited in Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618, 624 n.3 (1969).
4 The Court affirmed the decisions below in three cases on
appeal from three-judge district courts. Harrell v. Tobriner,
279 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F.
Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp.
333 (D Conn. 1967), aff'd, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); accord,
Denny v. Health & Social Servs. Bd., 285 F. Supp. 526 (E.D.
Wis. 1968); Robertson v. Ott, 284 F. Supp. 735 (D. Mass.
1968); Ramos v. Health & Social Servs. Bd., 276 F. Supp.
474 (E.D. Wis. 1967); Green v. Department of Pub. Wel-
fare, 270 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1967). Contra, Waggoner v.
Rosenn, 286 F. Supp. 275 (M.D. Pa. 1968), vacated and re-
manded, 394 U.S. 846 (1969).
5 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 639 n.22 (1969). For
a complete list of state statutory welfare residence require-
ments, see Note, Residence Requirements in State Public
Welfare Statutes, 51 IowA L. REv. 1080, 1091-95 (1966)
(Appendix).
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and totally disabled individual who had been denied aid.
Each of the individual applicants met all requirements for
welfare assistance except residence in his jurisdiction for
one year immediately preceding his application. Accordingly,
the denial of assistance by welfare authorities was based solely
on each applicant's failure to meet the one year residence
requirement. As a result, two classes of needy residents were
created by the one year waiting period with the only dis-
tinction between the two groups being that one had resided
in the state for at least one year while the other had resided
in the state for less than one year.6
The principal objective advanced in support of the wait-
ing period was a desire to deter the migration of indigent
persons to states having higher welfare assistance payments.
Thus, the proposition was that an influx of indigents would
place an unwarranted burden on the financial resources of
such states.7 Before ruling on the constitutionality of the
principal objective, the Court reaffirmed the right to travel
among the states as a basic right under the Constitution.8
Several prior decisions of the Court were cited as authorities
which established this basic right to travel interstate; how-
ever, the majority was reluctant to attribute that right to
any specific provision of the Constitution.9 Then, the Court
ruled that the avowed objective of impeding migration of
indigent persons violated the basic constitutional right to
travel interstate; and therefore, that objective could not be
utilized to justify the residence requirement.10
Welfare authorities also argued four administrative and
related governmental objectives in support of the waiting
period. As stated by the Court, "the requirement (1) facili-
tates the planning of the welfare budget; (2) provides an
6 394 U.S. at 627.
7 Id. at 627-28.
s Id. at 629-31.
9 Id. at 630 n.8.
10 Id. at 631.
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objective test of residency; (3) minimizes the opportunity
for recipients fraudulently to receive payments from more
than one jurisdiction; and (4) encourages early entry of
new residents into the labor force.""
While accepting the four propositions as proper state
objectives, the Court ruled that they must be able to with-
stand the compelling state interest test before such objectives,
would be constitutional under the equal protection clause."
That the compelling state interest test was the proper standard
to be applied is clearly shown by the following statement:
[I]n moving from State to State or to the District
of Columbia appellees were exercising a constitutional
right, and any classification which serves to penalize
the exercise of that right, unless shown to be neces-
sary to promote a compelling governmental interest,
is unconstitutional.18
To determine whether the standard had been satisfied, the
Court ascertained that the four objectives were not neces-
sary to promote a compelling state interest because welfare
authorities either did not use the objectives or could have
accomplished them by some alternative method. Therefore,
the residence requirement violated the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment.14
Although the opinion left no doubt that the compelling
state interest test was determinative, it was noted that the
waiting period would also be unconstitutional under tradi-
tional equal protection standards. 5 Traditional equal pro-
tection standards apply where the classification is purely
n Id. at 634.
12 For other applications of the compelling state interest test,
see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958).
13 394 U.S. at 634 (Citations omitted.) (emphasis by the Court).
14 Id. at 634-38.
't Id. at 638.
[Vol. 6, No. 3
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arbitrary so that there is no reasonable basis for the classi-
fication.18
Since the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment does not apply to the District of Columbia, the waiting-
period requirement of that jurisdiction was held unconstitu-
tional under the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
To reach that conclusion, the same reasoning that had been
applied to the state statutes was held to be controlling as
to the District of Columbia Statute. Thus, according to the
Court, the classification created by the District's waiting period
was so unjustifiable that it denied due process. 7
Notwithstanding the alternative grounds noted in the
majority opinion, clearly, the holding in Shapiro was ground-
ed principally on the compelling state interest standard.18
Based on that standard, a two step procedure was used to
determine whether the classification created by the residence
waiting period was constitutionally permissible under the
equal protection clause. First, did the classification create
a group whose members had been denied some fundamental
right guaranteed by the Constitution? That question was
answered in the affirmative because the members of the
group which resulted from the residence requirement had
been deprived of the fundamental right to travel among
the states without restriction. Secondly, did the state objec-
tives urged in support of the denial of a fundamental right
qualify as compelling state interests? After answering that
question in the negative, the Court distinctly stated the
holding as follows:
[T]he traditional criteria do not apply in these cases.
16 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
17 394 U.S. at 641-42.
18 For a thorough analysis of the constitutionality of welfare
residence requirements and the alternative theories avail-
able to the courts on that question, see Harvith, The Con-
stitutionality of Residence Tests for General and Categorical
Assistance Programs, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 567 (1966).
1970]
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Since the classification here touches on the funda-
mental right of interstate movement, its constitution-
ality must be judged by the stricter standard of wheth-
er it promotes a compelling state interest. Under this
standard, the waiting-period requirement clearly vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause.10
Under a plan for joint federal and state funding of wel-
fare assistance, the residence requirements in Shapiro had
been accepted by Congress. As provided by statute under
the plan, federal approval was required for state plans which
had a one year residence requirement for aid to dependent
children and a five of nine years residence requirement for
old age assistance, aid to the blind, and aid to the permanently
and totally disabled.20 Why did Congress adopt the fore-
going residence requirements? Professor Harvith, Visiting
Assistant Professor of Law and Legal Director, Project on
Social Welfare Law, New York University School of Law,
has suggested that Congress may have accepted state residence
requirements because such requirements were traditional in
assistance programs.2' Whatever the reason, congressional
acceptance could not authorize violation of the equal pro-
tection clause.22
Though the residence requirements in Shapiro were en-
acted under a joint federal-state program, the decision seems
to be applicable to all state Welfare assistance programs with-
out regard to whether such programs are jointly funded by
the federal government. There was no language in the
majority opinion which could reasonably be interpreted as
limiting the holding to an unconstitutional classification of
otherwise eligible residents under programs partially funded
19 394 U.S. at 638 (Footnote omitted.) (emphasis by the Court).
20 Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § § 302 (b) (2), 602 (b),
1202 (b) (1), 1352 (b) (1) (1964).
21 Harvith, The Constitutionality of Residence Tests for Gen-
eral and Categorical Assistance Programs, 54 CALiF. L. REv.
567, 592 n.179 (1966).
22 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969).
5
Holland: Residence Waiting Period Denies Equal Protection
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1969
RESIDENCE WAITING PERIOD
by the federal government. On the other hand, since the wait-
ing period was held to be repugnant to the equal protection
clause on the ground that it imposed an unconstitutional dis-
tinction between indigent applicants who had resided in the
jurisdiction for one year and such applicants who had resided
in the jurisdiction for less than one year, a statute which pro-
vided a waiting period for all indigent applicants would seem
to be constitutionally permissible.2
Following Shapiro, some states may be inclined to con-
sider legislation which excludes from welfare eligibility those
persons who migrate to such states for the sole purpose of
obtaining higher welfare assistance.24 The constitutionality
of a statute which included only persons seeking greater
benefits was not specifically decided in Shapiro because the
statutes considered by the Court excluded all new residents.
However, dictum in Shapiro indicates that such a classifica-
tion would also be repugnant to the equal protection clause.
Mr. Justice Brennan speaking for the majority said:
More fundamentally, a State may no more try
to fence out those indigents who seek higher welfare
benefits than it may try to fence out indigents gen-
erally. Implicit in any such distinction is the notion
that indigents who enter a State with the hope of
securing higher welfare benefits are somehow less
deserving than indigents who do not take this con-
sideration into account. But we do not perceive why
a mother who is seeking to make a new life for her-
2 See Id. at 637. See Also Note, Social Welfare-An Emerging
Doctrine of Statutory Entitlement, 44 NOTRE DAwE LAWYE
603 (1969) for a discussion of the constitutionally permissi-
ble limitations which the legislatures may place on indig-
ents' statutory "rights" to welfare benefits. But cf. Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963), indicating that the
distinction between right and privilege is no longer a con-
trolling factor once a privilege has been granted by a state
to some persons.
24 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 676 n.35 (1969)
(Harlan, J.) (dissenting opinion).
1970]
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self and her children should be regarded as less de-
serving because she considers, among others [sic] fac-
tors, the level of a State's public assistance. Surely
such a mother is no less deserving than a mother who
moves into a particular State in order to take ad-
vantage of its better educational facilities. 25
Moving now to the Oklahoma Statutes which provide
residence qualifications for welfare assistance,2" it is noted
that such statutes were also enacted pursuant to the plan
for joint federal and state funding of welfare assistance.27
Therefore, Shapiro, in effect, invalidated Oklahoma's welfare
residence requirements. Oklahoma's waiting period for aid
to dependent children was one year28- the same as the period
involved in Shapiro. A similar residence period was required
for aid to crippled children.29 An extended residence require-
ment of five years within the nine years immediately pre-
ceding the application for assistance (the last year of the
five years must immediately precede the application) was
25 394 U.S. at 631-32.
26 Oklahoma Social Security Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 56, § 164
(1961).
27 Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1396 (1964), as amend-
ed (Supp. IV, 1968).
28 Oklahoma Social Security Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 56, § 164
(d) (1) provides in part:
[Aid will be provided to a dependent child under
eighteen years who] has been a resident of this
state at least one (1) year immediately preceding
the date of the application for assistance; or if
under one (1) year of age was born within the year
immediately preceding the date of the application
for assistance and the parent or other relative with
whom the child is living has resided in the state
for one (1) year immediately preceding the date
of birth. ...
29 Oklahoma Social Security Act, OxLA. STAT. tit. 56, § 164(c)
(5) (1961).
[Vol. 6, NO. 3
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provided for old age assistance,30 aid to the blind,31 and aid
to the permanently and totally disabled.3 2
Welfare authorities in Oklahoma predict that the result
of Shapiro will be a considerable increase in welfare costs
to the State. According to State Welfare Director Lloyd Rader,
Oklahoma has more generous welfare benefits than most
surrounding states and can now expect to attract poor per-
sons from such states. Thus, it is estimated that the Shapiro
ruling could add as many as 17,000 persons to the welfare
roles at a cost of $6,000,000 annually.33
However, it is submitted that the Shapiro decision may
not increase costs to the extent estimated in the foregoing
paragraph. For example, in Smith v. Reynolds,34 the weight
of the evidence showed that poor persons generally did not
migrate to the State of Pennsylvania for the purpose of
obtaining higher welfare payments. Moreover, the cost of
providing assistance to new residents would not constitute a
significant position of the welfare budget in that State. 5 Fur-
thermore, some studies indicate that the costs attributable to
the administration of residence requirements may exceed the
welfare payments which would become necessary in the
absence of such requirements.3 6
Whatever the ultimate result in additional welfare costs
in Oklahoma, all welfare programs may be slated for drastic
revisions as a result of the Shapiro decision. Oklahoma State
30 Id. § 164(a) (1).
31 Id. § 164(b) (1).
32 Id. § 164(e) (1).
s1 Tulsa World, April 22, 1969, § A, at 1, col. 2; Id., April 23,
1969, § A, at 1, col. 3.
84 277 F. Supp. 65, 66 (E.D. Pa. 1967), affd sub nom. Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
35 277 F. Supp. at 67.
36 Note, Residence Requirements in State Public Welfare
Statutes, 51 IowA L. REV. 1080, 1083 (1966); cf. Smith v.
Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 65, 67 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd sub nom.
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). But see Harvith,
supra note 21, at 615-17.
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Welfare Director Lloyd Rader feels that the elimination of
residence requirements may reduce the time until state wel-
fare programs will be completely federalized.37 Also, the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Robert Finch,
has indicated that some form of national minimum welfare
program may become necessary now that welfare residence
requirements have been declared unconstitutional.38
It is the opinion of this writer that the compelling state
interest standard will be applied extensively by the Supreme
Court to all state laws which are challenged on the ground
that such laws create a forbidden classification under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Un-
doubtedly, the constitutionality of other residence waiting-
period requirements, such as residence prerequisites for voter
eligibility, resident college tuition and professional licenses,
will be challenged in actions based on the Shapiro rationale.
And it is probable that the rationale of Shapiro will not be
limited to residence requirements. Thus, one who attacks
the validity of any state classification on the basis of Shapiro
must establish that the challenged state law results in the
denial of a fundamental constitutional right and that the
groAnds for such denial fail to qualify as compelling state
interests. Accordingly, Shapiro established a clearly defined
standard to be applied whenever a state classification can
be brought within the compelling state interest doctrine.
Tommy L. Holland
.Tulsa World, April 22, .1969, § A, at 1, col. 2.
38 Id., May 1, 1969, § A, at 1, col. 6.
(Vol. 6, No. 3
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